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Comments
Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Joint,
Several, and Joint and Several Obligations
Since the turn of the century, there has been a considerable
infiltration of common law into the Louisiana field of cumulation
of actions or, as it is now termed by practicing lawyers, "joinder
of parties." It is the purpose of this comment to examine the
rules of substantive law dealing with the multipartied obliga-
tions, which ordinarily give rise to cumulation of actions. It is
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from such obligations that problems of cumulation of plaintiffs
or defendants most frequently stem. By demonstrating the fun-
damental differences between the common law and the civil
law in this area, it is hoped that the solution for the proper appli-
cation of the Louisiana procedural rules will be facilitated.
In order to simplify the presentation, the discussion will be
centered on the rules relating to the enforcement of obligations
against joint, several, and joint and several obligors. Generally,
these rules also apply to the enforcement of the rights of joint,
several, and joint and several obligees; and in those few instances
where different rules have been formulated, special mention
will be made.
COAMON LAw
In traditional common law theory, contracts of two or more
promisors are classified into joint, several, and joint and several.
A division of obligations into these three classes is but the initial
step in ascertaining the applicable procedural rules.
Since these concepts originated and were developed in the
area of contract law, and since the greatest difficulty is en-
countered in this field, more emphasis will be placed there. While
an exhaustive consideration of joint tortfeasors is beyond the
scope of this comment, the procedural aspects of this subject
may be briefly summarized. If the tortfeasors are acting in con-
cert, or their acts of negligence concur to contribute proximately
to the plaintiff's injury, their liability is joint and several.' On
the other hand, if the negligent acts of the tortfeasors are sep-
arated by time, or space or degree, their liability is several.2
Since the law of joint, several, and joint and several promises
1. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 85 (4th ed. 1932); PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 109 (1941); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 338 A
(rev. ed. 1936); Note, 13 CORN. L.Q. 473 (1928).
The one distinction between contractual and tort liability joint and
several is that the former is for a liquidated amount, while the latter, even
if due, is highly unliquidated and without a definite standard by which it can
be measured. As a result of this distinction, courts are not inclined to view
favorably a release with reservation of rights, but seem more disposed to
disregard the reservation. The reason for this holding is that deception is
available to the injured creditor, for he may attempt to reserve his rights
against A, after being paid by B under a compromise agreement, thus avail-
ing himself of double compensation. Ducey v. Patterson, 37 Colo. 216, 86 Pac.
109 (1906); Lanasa v. Beggs, 159 Md. 311, 151 Atl. 21 (1930), 29 MICH. L. REV.
263; McBride v. Scott, 132 Mich. 176, 93 N.W. 243 (1903); Larson v. Anderson,
108 Wash. 157, 182 Pac. 957 (1919). See also notes 27 and 89 infra.
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 109.
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covers only contracts in which several persons obligate them-
selves for the same performance, it is fundamental that these
rules must be limited to cases where the debtors promise but
one identical performance, not two or more separate and distinct
performances. 3 The common bail bond, for instance, whereby
different persons agree to be secondarily liable for different
amounts, aggregating the amount of the bail, would not fall
within any of the above categories, for the sureties are obligating
themselves for different performances. Once it has been ascer-
tained that but one duty exists under a multipartied contract,
the distinction between the three possible types becomes im-
portant in applying the widely variant substantive and pro-
cedural rules.
Because there are three different sets of rules, it is necessary
to consider the criteria by which the various types of obligations
are distinguished before the rules applicable to the different types
can be examined. 4 The historical approach of the Anglo-American
courts was to establish a presumption of law that the obligation
of two or more parties to any agreement for the performance of
one duty was joint.5 No special words evidencing intention to
contract jointly were necessary to bring into effect this legal
presumption, which could be overcome only by adding express
words of severance, or by a clear showing of a contrary intent
or interest on the part of the contracting parties.6
3. Some difficulty is experienced in making such a distinction, but it is
entirely necessary, for the law of joint, several, and joint and several obliga-
tions applies only to contracts for the same performance. 4 CORmIN, CON-
TRACTS §§ 925, 926 (1951).
See generally on this subject, 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 316 et seq. (1936).
4. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 128, comment (1932); Farni v. Tesson, 1
Black 309 (U.S. 1861); Hall v. Leigh, 8 Cranch. 50 (U.S. 1814).
5. Hill v. Tucker, 1 Taunt. 7, 127 Eng. Rep. 731 (C.P. 1807); 4 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 925; 2 'WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 322.
In SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE OF COMMON ASSURANCES, OR, A PLAIN AND
FAMILIAR TREATISE (1840), as reprinted in 2 WHARTON, THE LAW LIBRARY 211, §
375 (1841), it is said that, "If two, three, or more bind themselves in an obli-
gation, thus, obligamus nos, and say no more, the obligation is, and shall be
taken to be joint only, and not several."
The relatively recent case of United States Printing and Lithographing
Co. v. Powers, 233 N.Y. 143, 152, 135 N.E. 225, 227 (1922), said, "It is a general
presumption of law that, when two or more persons undertake an obligation,
they undertake jointly; words of severance being necessary to overcome this
primary presumption." See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 112 (1932), and
1 PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 11 et seq. (6th ed. 1873); 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 322. Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 113 (1932).
6. The interests of the parties may be so clearly several that courts will
disregard the usual presumption. Shipman v. Straitsville Mining Co., 158 U.S.
356 (1895); Spangenberg v. Spangenberg, 19 Cal. App. 439, 126 Pac. 379 (1912).
In this last cited case the court held that a contract of seven heirs to equally
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The early common law could not visualize the relations of the
obligors inter sese for it regarded these agreements as embodying
a single indivisible promise, creating a single indivisible obliga-
tion-a single vinculum juris, in which the plural parties were
conceived to be but one person. This unity of obligation and
indivisibility of liability of a joint debt has been maintained by
the common law to the present date and forms the foundation
of all modern theories of joint contracts.7
It was, of course, always possible for several persons to
promise separately by signing different documents, even though
they promised one single performance. In such cases no difficulty
was encountered in recognizing more than one separate, com-
pletely unrelated promise, and consequently several distinct
duties, each enforceable by a separate action.S
It soon became possible for parties, even though they signed
one single document, to produce this juridical result through the
use of the magic word "several."9 As a consequence, it appears
that, although the identical performance was promised, the all-
embracing vinculum juris had been loosened and the obligors
were looked upon as being indebted personally and individually
and in a manner completely unrelated to one another. In these
instances, the-obligee had separate and distinct causes of action
against each of the several obligors.
Eventually creditors sought to obtain the benefit of both
concepts in the same contract, and the courts recognized such
agreements as a joint and several liability, which, as its name
implies, is a mere consolidation of the previously developed forms
divide the estate of their father was a several undertaking, and consequently
the objection of nonjoinder was not properly taken. In Lovell v. Common-
wealth Thread Co., 272 Mass. 138, 172 N.E. 77 (1930), where two parties defen-
dant had hired the plaintiff for employment purposes in their respective
businesses, the court felt that the division of the interest on the part of the
defendants created a several contract.
See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 323; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 113, 115, 116
(1932). The UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 68 (1898) provides that
the obligation of joint payees or joint endorsees who sign the instrument
shall be joint and several. See, generally, 1 PARSONS, CONTRACTS C. 2, § 1, n. B,
and cases cited therein (6th ed. 1873).
7. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 112 (1932). From this principle of joint
contracts stems all the collateral theories which are still applied, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS §§ 121, 125, 129-132 (1932).
8. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 925.
9. Mathewson's Case, 5,Co. Rep. 22b, 77 Eng. Rep. 84 (C.P.); Collins v.
Prosser, 1 B. & C. 682, 107 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1823).
1954]
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of contract involving more than one person.10 There was still
only one document, and one performance to be rendered. This
novel development enabled the jurists in early English law to
construe the contract to contain one more promise than there
were parties, for every promisor was severally bound; but, at the
same time, all were jointly obligated. This combined form of
contract was favored by the creditors, for it had the advantages
of both the joint and the several forms."
With the aid of the presumption in favor of joint contracts
previously referred to, it was at one time assumed that the only
test of the particular type of contract entered into by more than
one person was the interest of the parties in the subject matter
of the contract, so that if their concern was deemed to be joint,
no words, however specific, could justify a finding of several
liability and vice versa.' 2 Under the present law, however, it ap-
10. Typical language would be "A and B jointly and severally promise"
or "We bind ourselves and each of us .... " See, e.g., Olmstead v. Bailey, 35
Conn. 584 (1869).
The use of the first person singular, as "I promise . . .Signed A, B, and
C" indicated that the parties contemplated liability both singularly and as a
group, thus jointly and severally. But such words may be overcome by
other expressions or by extrinsic factors commonly used in interpretation.
See Hurlbut v. Quigley, 180 Cal. 265, 180 Pac. 613 (1919); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS §§ 114, 115 (1932); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 937 (1951); 2 WILLSTON, CON-
TRACTS § 324 (1936).
Apparently, the creditors did not have the unrestricted option of suing
either jointly or severally, but must proceed jointly if possible, so the quali-
fication is chiefly procedural, and Is evidenced by the following cases:
Keightley v. Watson, 3 Ex. 716, 154 Eng. Rep. 1034 (Ex. 1849); James v.
Emery, 5 Price 529, 146 Eng. Rep. 685 (Ex. 1818); Scott v. Godwin, 1 Box. &
Pul. 67, 126 Eng. Rep. 782 (C.P. 1797); Petrie v. Bury, 3 B. & C. 353, 107 Eng.
Rep. 764 (K.B. 1824); Spencer and Durant, Comb. 115, 90 Eng. Rep. 376 (K.B.);
Eccleston v. Clipsham, 1 Wms. Saund. 153, 85 Eng. Rep. 158 (K.B. 1677);
Slingsby's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 18b, 77 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B.).
If, however, the interest of the covenantees of a joint and several con-
tract is completely several, they clearly may so sue, with the liberty to
proceed jointly. This development might be attributed to a protection of the
debtor from undue harassment due to repeated suits by his creditors. Many
statutes now provide that all joint obligations shall be classified as joint and
several. See Burdick, Joint and Several Liability of Partners, 11 COL. L. REV.
101 (1911); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 336 (1936).
11. 1 PARSONS, CONTRACTS 14 (1873). The creditor was given the privi-
lege of treating his debtors as jointly liable, thereby Invoking the benefits
and being subjected to the disadvantages of that form, or as severally
bound, in which case, the doctrine of several liability would come into play.
See note 10 supra.
12. The interest which is prominent as a criterion must be an interest in
the contract and not in any sum of money or other benefit to be received
from the contract. It is strictly a legal and technical interest, created by the
contract, and does not depend upon the condition or state of the parties
aside from the contract. Hopkinson v. Lee, 6 Q.B. 964, 115 Eng. Rep. 363
(K.B. 1845); Anderson v. Martindale, 1 East. 497, 102 Eng. Rep. 191 (K.B.
1801).
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pears settled that the interest of the parties is merely one of the
many factors considered for purposes of interpretation. These
factors have replaced the conclusive presumption favoring joint
obligations, which must now yield certainly to an express state-
ment, and probably to any indication in the contract of a different
will of the parties.' 3 The modern approach places special em-
phasis on the intentions of the parties, and any contractual
interpretation should have as its goal the ascertainment of that
element.14
Regardless of the type of obligation undertaken by the
parties, all persons liable for the same performance owe the debt
in its entirety. All promisors, whether they be joint, several, or
joint and several, are obligated to perform the totality of the duty
if so called upon by the creditor."5 Even though in the case of a
joint liability a joint judgment against all obligors must be ren-
dered, nevertheless, such judgment may be satisfied upon the
property of any debtor severally and individually.' 6 Thus, the
extent of the duty of each promisor is the same, regardless of
the form of obligation he has imposed upon himself. This rule is
13. Farni v. Tesson, 1 Black 309 (U.S. 1861); Petroleum Midway Co. v.
Moynier, 205 Cal. 733, 272 Pac. 740 (1928); Shurtleff v. Udall, 97 Vt. 156, 122
AtI. 465 (1923); Sorsbie v. Park, 12 M. & W. 146, 152 Eng. Rep. 1146 (Ex. 1843);
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 325 (1936).
For an interesting discussion and historical development of this problem,
see 1 PARSONS, CONTRACTS 14, n. (j) (1873).
14. Starrett v. Gault, 165 Ill. 99, 46 N.E. 220 (1896); Peters v. McDonough,
327 Mo. 487, 37 S.W.2d 530 (1931); Montague Mfg. Co. v. Homes Corp., 142 Va.
301, 128 S.E. 447 (1925); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 115, 128 (1932); 4 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 937 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 324 (1936).
It has been said that the consideration furnished is of importance and
especially so if other features of the contract do not conflict with this view.
In re Rose Co., 275 Fed. 409 (2d Cir. 1921); Satler Lumber Co. v. Exler, 239
239 Pa. 135, 86 Atl. 793 (1913); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 115 (1932).
15. Joint obligations: Leinkauff v. Munter, 76 Ala. 194 (1884); Saunders v.
Reilly, 6 N.Y. 452, 12 N.E. 170 (1887); Baum v. McAfee, 125 S.W. 984 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1910); Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155 Va. 312, 154 S.E. 587
(1930); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 928 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 207 (4th
ed. 1931).
Several obligations: 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 927, 928 (1951).
Joint and several obligations: Joint and several liability, merely giving
the creditor his choice of the two above discussed forms, both of which obli-
gate all debtors for complete performance, must, of necessity, have the same
result regardless of the form chosen by the obligee. Consequently, while the
different types of multipartied contracts did occasion differences of method,
they in no way affected the parties' liability to the creditor.
16. Leinkauff v. Munter, 76 Ala. 194 (1884); Clayton v. May, 68 Ga. 27
(1881); Hardy v. Overman, 36 Ind. 549 (1871); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 928
(1951). See note 18 infra.
Although joint obligors were primarily viewed as unitarily liable, since
they seldom held joint property, each must have been conceived in such a
case as bound individually in a somewhat metaphysical way, though not
subject to being sued alone.
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no doubt predicated on the requisite that there be only one single
performance contemplated, and one duty owed. Even though
some magic words might have severed the parties, they remain
liable for the entire amount for they all have combined to make
but one promise, and no distinction should be made in the
quantum of duty of each. Otherwise, if the liability of each were
distinct and ratable, there would be more than one duty; each
party would then owe a separate and distinct performance. How-
ever, differences of procedure and other collateral doctrines draw
sharp lines of demarcation between the different forms of lia-
bility.
Although at common law all the debtors were liable for
the complete performance, the obligee was never entitled to more
than one complete performance whether rendered by one debtor,
or by all for the aggregate amount.1 7 The moment the creditor
had received full satisfaction of his claim, all legal relations be-
tween creditor and debtors were extinguished, the further con-
sideration of equitable distribution of the burden between the
parties being left to the implied or actual agreement between the
debtors.
In addition to performance, other methods of discharging the
duty of two or more promisors exist, which, while not peculiar
to the law of multiple parties, raise difficulties not encountered
in any other field. It is, for example, possible for the obligee
to release the debt as to all or only part of the debtors. No prob-
lem is presented if the release extends to all the parties, for the
manifested intention of the parties would be efficacious, assuming
the presence of all formal elements. But if less than all the
obligors are released, resort must be had to the form of the par-
ticular agreement and to the theory upon which the obligation
is founded for a determination of the ultimate outcome of the
transaction. Since a joint promise of several parties produces one
undivided duty and calls for only one performance, it was early
held that a release of one person jointly bound releases all so
bound.' As the creditor has released the bond by which he held
17. 4 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 928 (1951). This is a necessary corollary of the
primary theory that but one promise has been made, and but one duty
incurred.
18. Reference is here made only to a strict release with no reservation.
Lunt v. Stevens, 24 Me. 534 (1845); Hale v. Spaulding, 145 Mass. 482, 14 N.E.
534 (1888); Rowley v. Stoddard, 7 Johns 207 (N.Y. 1810); North Pacific Mort-
gage Co. v. Krewson, 129 Wash. 239, 224 Pac. 566 (1924); Brooks v. Stuart,
[VOL. XIV
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the promisors bound, it follows that all are freed of their duty.
There can be little difficulty in aligning this result with the
fundamental theory of joint obligations, that one single per-
formance is due and only one promise has been made.
Reasons other than the unitary nature of a joint promise
have been offered to justify the rule under discussion. It has been
thought that a discharge of but one joint obligor would pre-
judice the rights of contribution held by the others.19 For instance,
of joint debtors, A, B, and C, creditor X releases A alone of his
obligation, choosing to hold B and C. While joint debtors are pri-
marily liable for the entirety of the debt, there generally exists
between the obligors an agreement, tacit or express, for some
distribution of the burden. 20 Either the duty of A to contribute
will be abrogated without the consent of the other parties, or he
will nevertheless be bound to indemnify his co-obligors for their
payment, which is unjust, for then A will be released from noth-
9 Ad. & E. 854, 112 Eng. Rep. 1437 (K.B. 1839); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 931
(1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 333 (1936).
Another rationale for such a rule, although most often attributed to the
unitary nature of joint duties, has been concisely refined to: "The reason
why a simple release of the principal debtor discharges the surety is that
it would be fraud on the principal debtor to profess to release him, and then
sue the surety who in turn could sue him." Mellis, L.J., in Nevill's Case,
L.R. 6 Ch. 43, 47 (1870).
This problem is thoroughly discussed in Williston, Releases and Cove-
nants Not to Sue Joint, or Joint and Several Debtors, 25 HARV. L. REv. 203
(1912). Many states have statutes providing that the discharge or com-
promise of one joint obligor shall not release the others, if the intention of
the parties is that they shall not be freed. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 931 (1951);
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 336 (1936). These statutes in effect make a release
of one joint debtor the equivalent of a covenant not to sue. In the opinion of
this writer, such statutes are advisable for two reasons: (1) They tend to
give effect to the intent of the parties and (2) they avoid the trap into
which many an unwary obligee has fallen by graciously releasing one of his
debtors only to find that he has actually discharged the entire obligation.
For examples of situations corrected by such statutes, see Clark v. Mallory,
185 Ill. 227, 56 N.E. 1099 (1900); Bonney v. Bonney, 29 Iowa 448 (1870); Fox
v. Hudson's Ex'x, 150 Ky. 115, 150 S.W. 49 (1912); Merritt v. Bucknam, 90 Me.
146, 37 Atl. 885 (1897); Brooks v. Neal, 223 Mass. 467, 112 N.E. 78 (1916);
Crawford v. Roberts, 8 Ore. 324 (1880); North Pacific Mortgage Co. v. Krew-
son, 129 Wash. 239, 224 Pac. 566 (1924).
19. Ward v. Fleming, 18 Ga. App. 128, 88 S.E. 899 (1916). But see Beam v.
Barnum, 21 Conn. 200 (1851), where a release of A was held to bar an action
against A, but not against B, his joint co-obligor, nor was it a bar in an action
by B against A for contribution. But, it is manifestly unjust for the released
creditor to be liable subsequently for contribution, for then he has been
released from nothing. The total debt should be reduced proportionately to
the part of him released. See, e.g., Lord Eldon in Ex parte Gifford, 6 Ves.
Jun. 805, 31 Eng. Rep. 1318; 1 Ves. Jun. Supp. 660, 34 Eng. Rep. 968 (Ch. 1802).
20. See page 839 infra.
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ing.21 It is now well settled, however, that a release of one joint
debtor relieves all so bound.
22
Following the reasoning given at common law for legal
discharge of joint debtors by a release of one, it might be assumed
that a contrary rule would obtain concerning joint and several
debtors, for their duties may be considered separate and distinct
at the choice of the creditor. The common law courts, however,
have generally held that a release of less than all joint and
several debtors effectuated a discharge of all.2 3 The best reason
advanced for this position is that however distinct may be the
duty of the respective parties, they are nevertheless bound for
one single performance. 24 In effect, the unitary characteristic
of joint and several liability is accorded predominance over the
severance incorporated in the same contract. Since the rendition
of one performance certainly discharges the obligation of all,
it is reasoned that the same result should follow from a substi-
tuted payment received in full satisfaction. Hence, the courts
might think that the release was given for performance rendered,
or should be so construed.25 Consequently, any liability suffered
by other joint and several obligors theoretically amounts to dou-
ble compensation to the obligee. However, it should be noticed
that any presumption of satisfaction accorded to the release may
21. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 968, § 333 (1936) takes the position that no
release by a creditor of one joint debtor should affect the right of contribu-
tion, for to do so would be to sanction the deprivation of the other debtors
of substantial rights without their consent. That appears proper, for the
total debt should be proportionately reduced.
22. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 121(1) (1932): "Where the obligee of a
joint contractual promise discharges a promisor by release, rescission or
accord and satisfaction, the other joint promisors are thereby discharged."
23. This principle was established quite early. Cocke v. Jennor, Hobart
66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1724); Clayton v. Kynaston, 2 Salk 573, 91 Eng. Rep.
483 (K.B. 1699); Hammon v. Roll, March N.R. 202, 82 Eng. Rep. 475 (K.B.
1642). The more modern rule appears to be the same. Bradford v. Prescott,
85 Me. 482. 27 Atl. 461 (1893); American Bank v. Doolittle, 14 Peck 123 (Mass.
1833); Frink v. Green, 5 Barb. 455 (N.Y. 1849); Crawford v. Roberts, 8 Ore.
324 (1880); Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis. 138, 6 N.W. 518 (1880); 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 334 (1936).
24. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 281 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 334 (1936).
If the reason predicated on the solidary nature of performance due was
sound, it should follow that a release of several debtors would likewise dis-
charge others; but, apart from suretyship principles, that has never been
asserted.
25. Benjamin v. McConnell, 9 IIl. 536 (1847). In Colby v. Walker, 86 N.H.
568, 571, 171 Atl. 774, 776 (1934), it was said that ". . . it Is not the fact of
release of one but of compensation made that bars the later suit. It is not the
mere act of releasing, but the Implication therefrom of full recompense
which is vital." The court, however, in the same opinion, properly recognized
that the legal presumption of satisfaction will be disregarded where there
are words in the release from which a different intent can be drawn.
[VOL. XlV
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well be, and often is, erroneous, since other reasons might have
motivated the action of the creditor; the result in this case is
that the obligee receives no compensation for his contract right,
which is grossly inconsistent with the original intentions of the
parties.
Because of the questionable rationale given for the rule that
a release of fewer than all joint and several debtors without re-
serving rights against certain debtors discharges all co-obligors,
the American Law Institute has departed from the common law
by stating that in this situation the other debtors are "discharged
from their joint duty but not from their several duties.' '26 This
more logical and practical rule brings the law of release into
harmony with the common law principle that judgment against
one joint and several obligor discharges the joint obligation
without impairing the several duties of the promisors.
27
26. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 123 (1932): "Where the obligee of joint and
several contractual promises discharges a promisor by release, rescission, or
accord and satisfaction, the other promisors are thereby discharged from
their joint duty, but not from their several duties. ... " This rule of the
American Law Institute was suggested by Gillespie v. Smith, 229 Fed. Cas.
760 (N.D. W. Va. 1918) and Krbel v. Krbel, 84 Neb. 160, 120 N.W. 935 (1909).
27. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 119(1) (3) (1932): "(1) A judgment rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction within the United States against one or
more joint promisors, or against one or more joint and several promisors,
upon a joint promise, discharges the joint duty of the other promisors.
"(3) The several duty of a promisor who Is severally, or jointly and
severally bound with others Is not discharged by judgment for or against one
or more of the others."
See, to the same effect, United States v. Ames, 99 U.S. 35 (1878); Sessions
v. Johnson, 95 U.S. 347 (1877); Simonds v. Center, 6 Mass. 18 (1809); Noble v.
Beeman-Spaulding-Woodard Co., 65 Ore. 93, 131 Pac. 1006 (1913).
As a result of extensive legislative activity In this field, a summary can
consist of no more than a reiteration of well-recognized concepts, with ref-
erence being provided to the various statutes.
The Uniform Joint Obligations Act, § 5(a) provides that if the releasing
obligee knows or has reason to know that the released obligor did not pay as
much of the debt as he was hound to pay, according to the contract or rela-
tions with his co-obligors, the claim shall be satisfied to the amount the
released debtor should have paid.
If the creditor is unaware of any such contract or relationship between
his debtors, paragraph (b) provides that the obligation shall be satisfied
(1) in the amount of the fractional share of the released obligor; or (2) equal
to the amount such obligor was bound by contract or relation to pay,
whichever of these alternatives Is lesser.
Section 3 of the act Introduces rules of suretyship Into the theory of
release, without express reservation of rights, to the extent that the other
co-obligors will be considered released in the amount which their rights of
indemnification are impaired. See N.Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 231 et seq.
(1950) (statutory developments in this field are plentiful); 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 336 (1936), but it is to be noted that a statute converting joint liability
into joint and several would not modify the basic rule of complete release,
for they are as well applicable to joint and several contracts as to joint. See
notes 1 and 16 supra.
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Seeing their intentions to release only one debtor thwarted
by the courts, creditors sought to circumvent the operation of
the rule of complete discharge by explicitly stating in the release
of one debtor that they reserved complete rights against all
other debtors. The courts nevertheless held such attempts to be
ineffective as attempting to accomplish something which was
impossible in the nature of things.2 Since a release had been held
to discharge the debt in its entirety, the courts could not con-
sistently at the same time "reserve other rights" and continued to
hold that the debt was entirely released.
Apart from these cases it had been held since the earliest
recorded cases that a contract to forbear perpetually to sue was
a bar to the original cause of action.29 Labeled a covenant not
to sue, such an agreement affords a simple method of accomplish-
ing the purpose of releasing one joint debtor, while retaining the
others. Through such an agreement, the obligee actually does
not remit the debt of any of the obligors.30 Here a joint or joint
and several debtor, although he has received a covenant not to
be sued, must nevertheless submit to a joint judgment being ren-
dered against him. His protection under the covenant manifests
itself only by preventing execution of the judgment upon his
property, thereby achieving the same practical result as if the
favored debtor had been individually released initially.3'
28. Kearsley v. Cole, 16 M. & W. 128, 153 Eng. Rep. 1128 (Ex. 1864); Webb
v. Hewitt, 3 K. & J. 438, 69 Eng. Rep. 1181a (K.B. 1857); Nicholson v. Revill,
4 Ad. & E. 675, 111 Eng. Rep. 941 (K.B. 1836).
Consistent with the indivisible theory of joint obligations, it was felt
that the obligee must either retain all obligors or release all of them. He
could not divide his legal right into different parts and hold some while
dropping others, for that was seeking to obtain that which was contradictory
by terminology.
29. Flinn v. Carter, 59 Ala. 364 (1877); Foster v. Purdy, 5 Met. 442 (Mass.
1843); Stebbins v. Niles, 25 Miss. 267 (1852); Thurston Gardner & Co. v.
James, 6 R.I. 103 (1859); Ford v. Beech, 11 Q.B. 842, 116 Eng. Rep. 689 (Q.B.
1848); Smith v. Mapleback, 1 T.R. 441, 99 Eng. Rep. 1186 (K.B. 1786); Hodges
v. Smith, Cro. Eliz. 623, 78 Eng. Rep. 864 (K.B. 1598).
This was to avoid circuity of action, for if the obligee were allowed
recovery on his claim the obligor could recover precisely the same damages
for the breach of the covenant not to sue. Consequently, the courts simply
said that such an agreement extinguished the original debt. RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 405(1) (1932); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 932, 933 (1951); 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 338 (1936).
30. Mason v. Jouett's Admr., 2 Dana 107 (Ky. 1834); Durell v. Wendell,
3 N.H. 369 (1837); Couch v. Mills, 21 Wend. 424 (N.Y. 1839); Hutton v. Eire,
6 Taunt. 289, 128 Eng. Rep. 1046 (C.P. 1815); Fitzgerald v. Trant, 11 Mod. 254,
88 Eng. Rep. 1022 (K.B. 1710); Lacy v. Kinnaston, 3 Salk. 298, 91 Eng. Rep.
835 (K.B. 1701); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 121(2) (1932).
31. Roberts v. Strong, 38 Ala. 566 (1863); Kendrick v. O'Neill, 48 Ga. 631(1873); Snyder v. Miller, 216 Ind. 143, 22 N.E.2d 895 (1939); Shed v. Pierce,
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Because of the unsatisfactory treatment of releases with
reservation in the early cases, the covenant not to sue was gen-
erally adopted as a method for accomplishing the results intended
by the parties. In time, releases with reservation came to be con-
strued not as a release of the named obligor, for such a simple
holding was precluded by the earlier jurisprudence to the con-
trary, but as a covenant to forbear to sue.32 Thus, any objection
must now be directed to the circuitous manner of reaching the
result or to the questionable use of one rule of interpretation
to frustrate another substantive rule of law. The ultimate goal,
however, the recognition and enforcement of the intention of
the parties, finally was attained.
Since all co-debtors from the same promise were liable for
complete performance and a joint judgment could be executed in
its entirety upon the property of any one debtor, a need for some
adjusting or equalizing device to distribute the burden more equi-
tably was early recognized. The parties began to agree among
themselves, prior to undertaking an obligation, that each should
17 Mass. 623 (1822); Benton v. Mullen, 61 N.H. 125 (1881); Rowley v. Stod-
dard, 7 Johns 207 (N.Y. 1810); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 338 (1936).
32. Northern Ins. Co. v. Potter, 63 Cal. 157 (1883); Bradford v. Prescott,
85 Me. 482, 27 Atl. 461 (1893); Colby v. Walker, 86 N.H. 568, 171 Atl. 774 (1934);
Hubbell v. Carpenter, 5 N.Y. 171 (1851); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 932 (1951);
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 338C (1936).
The early jurists never receded from the position that a "release" of one
included all, or from the belief in the unitary nature of joint obligations.
For instance, see Coleridge, J., in Price v. Barker, 4 El. & Bl. 760, 119 Eng.
Rep. 281 (Q.B. 1855). "We quite agree with the doctrine laid down by Lord
Denham in Nicholson v. Revill .... as explained by Baron Parke in Kearsely
v. Cole ... that if the deed is taken to operate as a release, the right against
a party jointly liable cannot be preserved; and we think that we are bound
by modern authorities . . . to carry out the whole intention of the parties
as far as possible, by holding the present to be a covenant not to sue, and
not a release. It is impossible to suppose for a moment that the parties to
this deed could have contemplated the extinguishment of their rights as
against parties jointly liable."
But why the necessity for such circuitous reasoning, merely to obtain a
result which is obvious? See Rutledge, J., in McPenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d
659 (D.C. Cir. 1943). See also Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl.
883 (1915), especially the concurring opinion of Wheeler, J., 89 Conn. 74, 97,
92 Atl. 883, 890 (1915).
The rules herein discussed apply equally as well to joint and several ob-
ligations. The covenant not to sue (release with reservation) can be of no
concern if the obligee chooses to proceed severally against other parties
than the covenantee. Of course, a several action against the covenantee him-
self is subject to the same rules as though he were the sole obligor, i.e., he
has a perfect defense. However, should the creditor elect to pursue his
cause against the debtors jointly, the above discusion is pertinent. Thomp-
son v. Lack, 3 C.B. 540, 136 Eng. Rep. 216 (C.P. 1846); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS §§ 123, 130 (1932); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 931 et seq., 937 (1951); 2
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 334, 338 (1936).
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be liable only for a ratable share or for a determined part of the
performance. Such a contract, of course, could not affect the rights
of the obligee. His privilege of proceeding for the full amount
against the property of any obligor remained unaffected by an
agreement between the co-debtors.3 3 But the courts did give
effect to the agreement as concerned the parties' relationship
with one another, each party mutually having the right and duty
of contribution in the previously determined proportion.3 4
Special problems arise in those cases where no such prior
specific agreement exists, and the prejudiced debtor seeks contri-
bution as a matter of right. This right to contribution depends
upon the type of contract liability the parties have assumed
and their peculiar relationship to one another, such as guarantor
or surety, the liability of each party being proportionate to his
interest in the matter.85
Although the principal debtor and his sureties are usually
made obligors in equal degree in contracts of surety or guaranty,
so that complete recovery may be had against any of the parties,
as between themselves, only the principal debtor must ultimately
33. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 117 (1932). See notes 13 and 14 supra.
34. For examples of such contracts, see Williams v. Riehl, 127 Cal. 365,
59 Pac. 762 (1899), where sureties had restricted their liability to a certain
portion of the whole. The court allowed some of the sureties who had been
assigned for value the judgment against them to collect an aliquot share
from their co-sureties. Quaere: Was this a promise of one performance, to
which the doctrine of contribution was properly applicable?
Wilmarth v. Hartman, 238 Mich. 20, 213 N.W. 73 (1927), where the agree-
ment stated, "It is hereby agreed that the proportionate share of each re-
spective signer shall be absolutely limited to their share in the capital stock
... as set opposite our names .. " The court held that liability must be
proportioned between the parties on the basis of the contract.
Armitage v. Pulver, 37 N.Y. 494 (1868), where contribution was allowed
between co-sureties on a bond, as a matter of equity and common sense,
in proportion to the number of parties.
35. Re Charles B. Toole, 274 Fed. 337 (2d Cir. 1921); Waters v. Waters,
110 Conn. 342, 148 Atl. 326 (1930); Asylum of St. Vincent De Paul v. McGuire,
239 N.Y. 375, 146 N.E. 632 (1925), 35 YALE L.J. 92 (1925); Taylor v. Everett,
188 N.C. 247, 124 S.E. 316 (1924); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 936 (1951); 2 WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS § 345 (1936).
It Is clear, therefore, that the party primarily liable has no rights to
compensation, for he was obligated to pay the debt in Its entirety, while
secondary obligors are entitled to full indemnification from the primary
debtor. Often this problem will be circumvented by conditioning the duty of
the secondary obligor upon the failure of the primary obligor to meet the
performance.
Consequently, the conclusion may well be drawn that the equitable doc-
trine of contribution is applicable only to those debtors laboring under a
common and equal burden. Phillips v. Preston, 5 How. 278 (U.S. 1847);
Gillespie v. Campbell, 39 Fed. Cas. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889); King v. Price, 212
Ala. 344, 102 So. 702 (1935) j J. F. Elkins Const. Co. v. Naill Bros., 168 Tenn.
165, 76 S.W.2d 326 (1934); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 81 (1936).
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bear the loss, since he alone has an interest in the subject matter
of the agreement. Consequently, any recovery against a surety
or guarantor gives rise to a right of contribution against the
principal debtor.
Between equally interested obligors, inter sese, as is usually
the case where there are several debtors, each is indebted for
his ratable share.36 Joint obligors, generally being equally in-
terested in the contract, have rights and duties to pay their pro-
portionate share and no more.8 7 The debtor who has been prej-
udiced by overpaying his part cannot recover the complete per-
formance, or payment, but only that which exceeds his share.38
No rights or duties of contribution attach to several liability,
since the obligors themselves have severed their relations with
one another by making their contract in this form, each having
elected to stand in his own right for complete performance. There
is no legal connexity between the parties, each being liable under
a different cause of action, since two separate promises were
originally made.
The cases indicate that the right of contribution between
joint and several debtors depends for its existence upon the elec-
tion of the creditor to sue jointly. An election to sever by the
creditor places the legal relations back into the classification of
36. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Naylor, 237 Fed. 314 (8th
Cir. 1916); Garrett v. Snowden, 226 Ala. 30, 145 So. 493 (1933); Willmon v.
Koyer, 168 Cal. 369, 143 Pac. 694 (1914); Lorimer v. Julius Knack Coal Co., 246
Mich. 214, 224 N.W. 362 (1929); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 105 (1936); 2 WiL-
USTON, CONTRACTS § 945 (1936).
The obligation of those debtors owing contribution is a several one, bear-
ing all effects of that type liability, and not joint, even though the original
liability was of a joint nature. Meyrowitz v. Wattel, 149 Misc. 862, 267 N.Y.
Supp..591 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1933); Fletcher v. Jackson, 23 Vt. 581 (1851).
37. See note 25 supra. Generally contribution is not available in the ab-
sence of statutory enactments to joint tortfeasors. Turner v. Kirkwood, 49
F.2d 590 (10th Cir. 1931); Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep.
1337 (K.B. 1799); PROSSER, TORTS 1111, § 109 (1941).
As concerns joint and several obligors, it would seem that the right to
contribution in favor of the debtors depends upon the particular type of
liability which the creditor chooses to pursue. Clearly, contribution would
lie under a joint action, as such a case is exactly the same as though the
duty was originally joint. Should the creditor choose to proceed severally,
it is doubted that the debtor selected to be sued would be entitled to claim
indemnification against his joint and several debtors. See note 37 infra.
38. Unlike the rules of indemnity and exoneration, the party entitled to
contribution is permitted to recover only the amount he has paid in excess
of his aliquot share, not the entire amount paid out by him. Houck v. Gra-
ham, 106 Ind. 195, 6 N.E. 594 (1886); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md.
372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 85 (1936); 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 945 (1936).
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several obligors and deprives the debtors of their right of contri-
bution.8 9
Perhaps the most controversial doctrine attaching to obliga-
tions of two or more persons is that of survivorship. Following the
analogy of survivorship in joint estates in land, the common law
holds that upon the death of any joint obligor, the whole duty
devolves upon the remaining debtors, the estate of the deceased
being in no way responsible for his liability.4° The last surviving
obligor thereby becomes liable for the entire amount by a process
of elimination. Upon his death, the debt is imposed upon his
estate.
41
The purported basis for this sometimes harsh doctrine is that
none of the debtors or any of their executors made a separate
promise; thus the joinder of surviving obligors with the executor
of the deceased is prohibited.42 Since the original parties made
one indivisible promise, the death of one merely destroys a
possible party to the performance, and precludes joinder of that
party; but the estate of the deceased does not succeed to the
debt. The real reason is that the early procedure was not suffi-
ciently adaptable to allow a judgment requiring two kinds of
execution: one against the remaining obligors for the full amount
of the debt, and another against the executor of the deceased,
39. There is some authority for the position that several obligors are not
entitled to contribution [McArthur v. Board, 119 Iowa 562, 93 N.W. 580
(1903); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930)], but
notice the confusion of the court in calling the contract "several" in the
Cunningham case, when each obligor labored under an entirely separate duty.
Note, 98 AM. ST. REP. 31 (1903).
The scarcity of authority demonstrates the highly academic nature of
the problem, so it should be dismissed with the suggestion that contribution
is presumed to exist in all contracts involving more than two parties for the
same performance and requires a clear showing of a contrary intent of the
parties to defeat it, with the touchstone being that he who has removed a
common burden and established a mutual gain is entitled to indemnifica-
tion. Taylor v. Morrison, 26 Ala. 728 (1855); Waldref v. Dow, 172 Minn. 52,
214 N.W. 767 (1927); Screven v. Joyner, 1 Hill Eq. 252 (S.C. 1833) 2 WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS § 345 (1936).
40. Packersgill v. Lahens, 15 Wall. 140 (U.S. 1873); Carter v. Mizell, 214
Ala. 182, 106 So. 846 (1926); Davis v. Van Buren, 72 N.Y. 587 (1878); Mc-
Laughlin v. Head, 86 Ore. 361, 168 Pac. 614 (1917); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 345 (1936).
41. Buckley v. Wright, 2 Root 10 (Conn. 1793); Gere v. Clark, 6 Hill 350
(N.Y. 1844).
42. See note 47 et seq. infra for rules of joinder at common law. Suffice it
to say at this point that all joint obligors were necessary parties to a suit
on the obligation, exclusive of everyone else. Consequently, A could no longer
be joined after his death, and neither his executor nor his estate was a
party to the original contract.
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also for the full amount, but to be executed only against the
estate of the deceased promisor.4
All too often this worked undue hardship, both on creditors
and debtors alike. The creditor might be completely deprived
of any effective redress, should the financially irresponsible
obligor outlive the solvent debtors, making satisfaction of any
judgment impossible for the creditor. The debtors themselves
might be prejudiced in some cases, for the surviving debtor could
ultimately be faced with a liability greater than he ever antici-
pated.44
The legislatures of many states, probably motivated by the
hardships caused by the doctrine of survivorship, have provided
by statute that common law joint obligations shall be construed
to be joint and several, thereby eliminating the application of
survivorship and relegating it to mere academic importance in
modern law.45 In Massachusetts the statute simply authorizes ac-
tion against the executor of the deceased debtor.46
Perhaps the most important area of difference between the
43. May v. Hanson, 6 Cal. 642 (1856); Eggleston v. Buck, 31 Ill. 254
(1863); Ayer v. Wilson, 9 S.C. (2 Mill) 319 (1818); Fisher v. Chadwick, 4
Wyo. 379, 34 Pac. 899 (1893); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 344 (1936).
44. Although the debtor who survives retains his right of contribution
against the estates of his joint obligors, he will nevertheless be subjected
to immediate hardship by loss of his right to joinder and benefits flowing
therefrom. Defenses of the deceased parties die with them; immediate dis-
tribution by demands or corollary contribution are lost; and the surviving
debtor is forced to seek contribution through the often indirect and slowly
moving channels of judicial recourse, without acquiring it in the same suit.
45. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 930 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 336, 344
(1936). See further the UNIFORM JOINT OBLIGATIONS ACT, § 6: "On the death
of a joint obligor in a contract, his estate shall be bound as such jointly and
severally with the surviving obligor or obligors." Sisto v. Bambara, 228 App.
Div. 456, 240 N.Y. Supp. 121 (2d Dep't 1930).
The modern law has sounded the death knell of survivorship by giving
the obligee an equitable remedy against the estate of the deceased obligor
whenever necessary. Ely Walker Dry Goods Co. v. Blake, 59 Okla. 103, 158
Pac. 381 (1916); Hengst's Appeal, 24 Pa. 413 (1855); Boyd v. Bell, 69 Tex. 735,
7 S.W. 657 (1888); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 930 (1951).
In some cases the court has permitted a proceeding against the estate of
the deceased obligor on the reasoning that while the party was-alive, he had
received part of the consideration given for the joint promise. United States
v. Price, 50 U.S. 83 (1850); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 2 Har. & J. 480 (Md. 1894);
Wood v. Fisk, 63 N.Y. 245 (1875).
46. MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 227, §§ 14, 15; c. 223, § 32; c. 228, § 7 (1933); Lee v.
Blodget, 214 Mass. 374, 102 N.E. 67 (1913). Thus, legislative whittling has
reduced the rigors of the former rule of survivorship to its present place
among historical relics. Furthermore, all statutes which make obligations of
two or more several as well as joint, even though executed in joint form,
destroy the supposed oneness of the promise and effectively divide the vincu-
lum juris, in which case survivorship has no application. See Bowman v.
Kistler, 33 Pa. 106 (1859).
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three types of multipartied contracts is found in the various
procedural rules applicable to the different rights and duties
created. The conceptual divergencies of the different forms of
contract directly result in wide variations of procedural rules.
Originally the unitary character of the joint promise made
by two or more persons was considered so important that if the
creditor brought action against fewer than all the creditors, a
plea of the general issue or a demurrer to the declaration would
be sustained, since it was deemed that no such promise as de-
clared on had been made. Judgment could not be obtained against
fewer than all joint obligors if objection was properly made.47
Such practice could produce delay and injustice, for the
unjoined debtor might be dead, or outside the jurisdiction of
the court. Lord Mansfield's intellectual vigor led to a revision
of this irrational situation. He held that the only method of
objecting to non-joinder was by a plea in abatement, sustainable
only by naming a debtor not joined who is alive and amenable
to process. 48 Failure of defendant to object properly would permit
definitive judgment to be rendered against him, as he must not
only object timely, but also in proper form. 49 This important
procedural change has been followed in England 0 and in
America5 ' with the result that objection to non-joinder must be
taken by affirmative answer in jurisdictions where pleas of abate-
ment have been suppressed.
If one of the joint obligors, when sued alone, did not plead
in abatement, or by affirmative answer, the other obligor being
alive and within the jurisdiction of the court, the judgment ob-
47. First National Bank of Clarion v. Hamor, 49 Fed. 45 (9th Cir. 1892);
Tweedy v. Jarvis, 27 Conn. 42 (1858); Richards v. Heather, 1 B. & Aid. 29, 106
Eng. Rep. 11 (K.B. 1817); Abbott v. Smith, 2 Black W. 947, 96 Eng. Rep. 559
(K.B. 1774); CHITTY, A TREATISE ON PLEADING 40 et seq. (13th Am. ed. 1867);
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 929 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 326, 327 (1936).
48. Rice v. Shute, 5 Burr. 2611, 98 Eng. Rep. 374 (K.B.), 2 W. BI. 695, 96
Eng. Rep. 409 (K.B. 1770). Such a ruling clearly expedites judicial progress
by requiring the party who would object to the nonjoinder to give the plain-
tiff a better writ than that on which he sues.
"If, however, it expressly appears on the face of the declaration, or some
other pleading of the plaintiff, that the party omitted Is still living, as well
as that he jointly contracted; in that case, the defendant may demur, or
move in arrest of judgment or sustain a writ of error." CHITTY, PLEADING 46
(13th Am. ed. 1867).
49. Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308 (1919); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 929 (1951);
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 327 (1936).
50. Powell v. Layton, 2 B. & P.(N.R.) 365, 127 Eng. Rep. 669 (C.P. 1806);
4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 929 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 327 (1936).
51. See note 50 supra.
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tained against the defendant was held to bar any subsequent
action against the party not joined.5 2 The most plausible reason
given for this rule is that the unjoined debtor has the same right
not to be sued alone as had the debtor who was previously sued.
He should not be deprived of that right of joinder by the mere
fact that one of the debtors had neglected to object to his absence.
However, if the unjoined debtor is outside the jurisdiction of the
court, the defendant debtor is unable to plead in abatement, for
he can provide no better writ, so the proceeding against him will
not bar subsequent action against the absent joint obligor, either
by the creditor for full satisfaction or by the judgment debtor
for contribution."5 This is apparently a recognition of the fact
that in some instances separate actions are not unjust against
joint promisors.
The common law concept of unity of obligation concerning
joint duties requires the joinder of all such debtors. Failure to
object to non-joinder, however, will permit judgment to be ren-
dered against only those joined. This last rule shows some degree
of inconsistency, for if the vinculum juris theory is to be re-
ligiously observed, no valid judgment should be possible against
fewer than all the debtors. The parties sued without their co-
debtors, in fact made no such promise as declared upon. The
obligation incurred emanated from an entity comprising one or
more debtors not present in the suit.
In the case of several obligations it is apparent from their
very nature and purpose that the promisors must be sued sep-
arately and individually.54 Each being individually bound, has
reserved the right of individual defense and perpetuated the
privilege of being sued individually. It would perhaps be more
52. Pirie v. Richardson [19271 1 K.B. 448; King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494,
153 Eng. Rep. 206 (Ex. 1844); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 929 (1951); 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 327 (1936). One of the reasons given for this result was that the
original obligation was completely merged and satisfied by the judgment.
Momentary reflection will prove that that is really no reason at all, but is a
mere restatement of the result.
53. Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308 (1919); Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500
(1846); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 327 (1936). The inconsistency of such a doc-
trine is obvious, for it violates the most fundamental concept of joint obliga-
tions, the oneness of duty. See Dill v. White, 52 Wis. 456, 9 N.W. 404 (1881),
where the court sought to attain consistency by entertaining the second suit
against the formerly absent joint obligor on a rule to show cause why the
judgment already obtained should not be enforced against the now present
defendant, a so-called scire facias proceeding.
54. Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 Fed. Cas. 562 (C.C. Mass. Cir. 1892); Franklin v.
Ferguson, 112 Ore. 641, 229 Pac. 683 (1924); Isaacs v. Salbstein [1916] 2 K.B.
139; CHITTY, PLEADINO 42a (13th Am. ed. 1867).
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correct to say that the creditor has bargained, in the making of
the contract, to obtain a form of obligation in which the rigors
of necessary joinder are absent. The debtor who is severally
bound is proceeded against on the basis of his individual con-
tract, with no relation to his co-debtor.
Concerning joint and several obligations, the rule was estab-
lished in Slingsby's Case that the duty of each obligor is either
joint or several at the discretion of the creditor.55 Consequently,
the obligee may proceed against each of the obligors severally
or against all of them jointly, at his discretion; but his only
remedies are those two, and he may not choose the middle ground
of joining more than one but less than all obligors.56 Once his
choice is manifested by instituting suit against more than one
(joint obligation) or against one only (several obligations), his
cause then becomes subjected to the rules peculiar to the form
of action which he has chosen.
Thus far only the effect of omission of a proper party-non-
joinder-has been considered. Different rules prevail, however,
if improper parties are joined in the suit with the defendant,
where the obligee has not only sued all the obligors, but has
thrown in an extra party for good measure-misjoinder. For
this mistake by declarant, he can be nonsuited, since proof of a
joint contract between the named parties would be impossible.5 7
It seems that a further and quite important feature peculiar to
misjoinder is that the objection can be raised only by persons
improperly joined and is available neither to a properly joined
55. 5 Coke 18b, 77 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1588). See CHITTY, PLEADING 43
(1867).
56. Poullain v. Brown, 80 Ga. 27, 5 S.E. 107 (1887); Bangor Bank v. Treat,
6 Greenl. 207 (Me. 1829); Mintz v. TO County Natural Gas Co., 259 Pa. 477,
103 Atl. 285 (1918); CHITTY, PLEADING 43 (13th Am. ed. 1867).
In this field we encounter a distinction between joint and several obli-
gees and like obligors. While the single plaintiff may freely elect to sue his
joint and several debtors either together or individually, it appears that such
obligees (plaintiffs) must nevertheless all collaborate to seek their remedy
if at all possible. Hatsell v. Griffith, 2 C. & M. 679, 149 Eng. Rep. 933 (Ex.
1834); Petrie v. Burie, 3 B. & C. 353, 107 Eng. Rep. 764 (K.B. 1824); Slingsby's
Case, 5 Coke 18b, 77 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1588); Spencer v. Durant, Comb. 115,
90 Eng. Rep. 376 (K.B.); Eccleston v. Clipsham, 1 Wms. Saunders 153, 85
Eng. Rep. 158 (K.B. 1677); CHITTY, PLEADING 8a (13th Am. ed. 1867).
57. CHITTY, PLEADING 44b, 45 (13th Am. ed. 1867), and cases cited therein.
Furthermore, the court would not permit amendment to cure the defect. Of
course, if the vice was apparent from the face of the pleadings, the demurrer,
arrest of judgment, or writ of error were available remedies to the defen-
dants. At this point, it should be noticed that the penalty for misjoinder
was much harsher than those for nonjoinder; consequently, the trap was
avoided by joining only those who are certainly proper parties. CHITTY,
PLEADING 44a, 45 (14th Am. ed. 1867).
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defendant nor to the plaintiff who had caused the joinder.58
Apparently this view is based upon the notion that a proper
party is in no way prejudiced by the presence of others and conse-
quently should have no objection. The courts seemingly felt that
if the improper defendant was willing to submit to judgment
against himself, a party truly responsible for the debt should not
object to such a charitable act. But how can the fact that it was
the real debtor who so often raised the objection be explained?
The rules of procedure regulating the rights or duties of
more than one party were highly technical. While the theory of
the various forms of obligations generally provided the basis
for the reasoning of courts, injustices nevertheless occurred,
probably due in part to the inexorable, narrow logic of the
courts. Most of the difficulties, it is true, have been obviated by
modern statutory enactments, but the historical background will
serve both as a guide to a better understanding of the present day
modifications and as a basis for a comparison of civilian theory.
LOUISIANA LAW
While the discussion of the common law involved detailed
historical exposition, the Louisiana law, typically civilian, is pri-
marily codified, and thus much less intricate. Because most of
the present Louisiana rules on joint, several and solidary con-
tracts are identical with Roman and French law, little specific
reference is necessary to those systems.
Of the various kinds of obligations provided for in the Loui-
siana Civil Code, the classification into joint, several and in solido,
very similar to like divisions in the common law, is designed to
regulate that field of law "where there are more than one obligor
or obligee named in the same contract. . . ,,19 This classification
of our Civil Code clearly includes promises to perform several
different acts in the same writing. A vital difference between
our Code and the common law is thereby established, for the
civilian doctrines do not restrict the law of multipartied con-
58. Kelly v. Carmichael, 217 Ala. 534, 117 So. 67 (1928); Gardner v.
Samuels. 116 Cal. 84, 47 Pac. 235 (1897); Hopson v. Harrell, 56 Miss. 202 (1878).
Contra: Cunningham v. Town of Orange, 74 Vt. 115, 52 Atl. 269 (1902).
Some courts have qualified this rule by permitting the objection by one
properly joined if it appears that his rights will be prejudiced thereby.
Gardner v. Samuels, 116 Cal. 84, 47 Pac. 935 (1897); Lowery Lock Co. v.
Wright, 154 Ga. 867, 115 S.E. 801 (1922). This rule apparently grew out of equity
pleading [STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS 472, § 544 (10th ed. 1892)], but it has been
applied in actions at law as well. See cases cited supra.
59. Art. 2077, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
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tracts to promises of the same performance. Thus, the criterion of
singularity of duty so important at common law is of less value in
our system.
The pattern established by the Civil Code of Louisiana is an
extremely simple one, in fact, startlingly so, when one compares
it with the intricacies of the Anglo-American equivalents. Loui-
siana has since 182560 expressly classified as several in nature6
those agreements wherein several promisors obligate themselves
to perform different acts, although contained in the same con-
tract. Thus there is from the very beginning an important dif-
ference in terminology. Judge Saunders in his Lectures on the
Civil Code urged that, as a practical matter, several obligations
existed only theoretically, for no business man would unite more
than one contract in the same writing. The learned jurist stated
that "as a matter of fact people never make their contracts in that
way, ' ' 62 for complications would be presented in return for which
no appreciable reward was realized. It is now clear, however,
that several liabilities do exist, at least in the form of the ordinary
bail bond, whereby several persons obligate themselves for a
stated portion of the total amount.63 In such cases, the ultimate
duty of each party is not the total amount covered by the agree-
ment, but the amount of his personal promise. The advantages
of such an obligation are present in the bail bond, permitting
several persons to make up the totality, but to limit their primary
liability to the amount set opposite their respective names.
Louisiana's two remaining forms of contract, however, are
restricted to the performance of one duty, for the joint and
the solidary contract are different types of agreement with dif-
ferent substantive effects available for several persons to promise
to perform the same act. It is clearly contemplated by the Civil
Code that promises of two or more persons in the same writing
shall be joint in nature,64 except where the term in solido or
60. Arts. 2073, 2074, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1825.
61. Arts. 2078, 2079, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870; Green, Harding & Co. v. Relf &
Co., 14 La. Ann. 828 (1859).
62. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 426 (1925).
63. The bail bond ordinarily embodies the agreement of two or more
persons to be liable for stated amounts, all of which, when added together,
comprise the whole of the obligation to be bonded. For instance, "We obli-
gate ourselves to stand as surety for the amount set opposite our names:
A .... $100; B .... $200; C .... $700" making up the whole of a $1000 bond.
It is obvious that the parties are promising to perform different duties,
having no relation to one another other than being made in the same
writing.
64. Arts. 2080, 2081, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
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other expression indicating an intent to be so bound is used,65
for the solidary undertaking is not to be presumed.6 6 This situa-
tion may be analogized to the presumption established in favor
of a joint contract in common law.
With the clear and definitive Code authority available, the
jurisprudence has contributed little more than tests for deter-
mining whether the promise is for a single performance or for
more than one. In Nabors v. Producers Oil Co.67 several land-
owners granted a mineral lease upon their property to the defen-
dant, with a clause requiring the oil company to drill within a
certain period of time to maintain the operation of the lease.
After the defendant had drilled on the property of two lessors,
the others instituted suit seeking the forfeiture of their lease on
the ground that their right was severable and had not been satis-
fied, the time allowed for drilling having passed. In finding a
joint contract, the court, through Justice O'Niell, emphasized the
fact that the true test of the nature of the contract should bethe intent of the parties, as revealed by the language of their
contract and the subject matter to which it refers. The object
of the contract at hand was the payment of consideration by the
oil company in a lump sum. Thus, the court eliminated several
liability by finding one single duty owed to all the lessors jointly,
and subsequent compliance with that duty by drilling on the land
of any plaintiff.68 It is clear that this contract could not have been
construed as establishing rights in solido, for such an intention
was not clearly set forth.
The intention of the parties determines vhether there is one
or more performances due. In the absence of a clearly evidenced
intent to be subject to a solidary liability, the contract will be
joint. Perhaps some cases have gone too far in finding the requi-
site showing of intent to contract in solido by holding that the
use of the first person singular ("I promise ... signed: A, B, and
65. Arts. 2082, 2083, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
66. Art. 2093, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. This rule ceased to prevail only In
cases where an obligation in solido takes place of right, by virtue of some
provision of the law. See Arts. 1681, 2113, 2324, 2804, 2872, 2905, 2957, 3026,
LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870. See the excellent comment on solidary obligations
under common law, Roman law, French law and Louisiana law, 25 TULANE
L. REV. 217 (1951).
67. 140 La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917).
68. See also A. Veeder Co. v. Pan American Production Co., 205 La. 599,
17 So.2d 891 (1944); Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd, 189 La. 903, 181 So. 439
(1938); Shell Petroleum Corportion v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185
La. 751, 170 So. 785 (1936).
1954]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
C.") creates an obligation in solido.6 9 It is doubtful that the inten-
tion of the parties actually adverted to the quite important dis-
tinction between signing that agreement and one phrased in the
first person plural ("We promise . . . signed: A, B, and C."),
which would bind the promisors only jointly.70 It seems that a
clearer expression of intent should be required for imposing the
rather stringent duties of liability in solido. The redactors of our
Code obviously sought to protect the unwary debtors and the
court should not, under the guise of contractual interpretation,
confer benefits of solidarity upon the creditor unless the requisite
indication in the language of the contract is present.
The intention test is applicable not only for the purpose of
solving the problem of whether there is one promise or more, in
order that the appropriate provisions of the Code may be applied,
but also for determining whether the contract is joint or solidary.
To create liability in solido, the existence of a clear intent is
necessary.
As opposed to the highly technical common law doctrine
which obligates all co-debtors in the same writing for the totality
of the performance, regardless of the particular type of liability
intended, the Civil Code of Louisiana specifically defines the
proportion of liability incurred by each promisor. Co-obligors
severally indebted, each having promised separate and distinct
performances, are responsible only for their individual obligations
and not for the aggregate of their promises.71 No difficulty or
injustice is created by the rule, for hardly any other result could
have been contemplated by the parties.
Joint undertakings do not obligate the individual obligors
for the debt in its entirety. Each party is held to have bound
himself only for his aliquot share, proportionate to the number
69. Watkins v. Haydel, 172 La. 826, 135 So. 371 (1931); Taylor v. Loeb, 13
La. App. 327, 127 So. 637 (1930); Bennett v. Allison, 2 La. 419 (1831); New
Orleans v. Ripley, 5 La. 120 (1833); Bank of Louisiana v. Sterling, 2 La. 60
(1830). But see Stowers v. Blackburn, 21 La. Ann. 127 (1869). The rule appar-
ently was an infiltration from the common law, since the earlier cases on
this subject liberally quoted Chitty. In view of the very clear expression in
Art. 2093, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, such action was entirely unjustified. In addi-
tion, it is somewhat surprising to note that many Louisiana tribunals use the
expression "joint and solidary" or "joint and several" to mean no more
than solidary liability.
70. See note 69 supra.
71. Art. 2084, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870: "Several obligations, although created
by one act, have no other effects than the same obligations would have had,
if made by separate contracts; therefore they are governed by the rules
which apply to all contracts in general."
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of debtors, in the absence of a contrary agreement.7 2 This result
seems to be in accord with the normal intentions of the parties
entering into a joint contract, a result which cannot be attained
in Anglo-American law. The circuity and uncertainty of leaving
the proper distribution of the debt to the theory of contribution
is avoided by a proper allocation of the debt in the original action.
On the other hand, solidary duties impose liability for com-
plete performance upon each co-debtor. 3 The words in solido
mean "for the full obligation," so a finding of this form of contract
will confer the benefit upon the creditor of demanding perform-
ance in full from any of the obligors, limited, of course, by the
rule that no creditor is ever entitled to more than one complete
performance. Solidary liability is very similar to the common
law category of joint and several, and some courts have gone so
far as to say that they are exactly the same.7 4 Such a statement
will be examined and questioned hereafter, especially from a
procedural point of view. The rule of complete liability imposed
upon solidary debtors probably points up the basic reason for
requiring specific expression of solidarity, or at least a clear
manifestation of intent, and preventing its inference. Otherwise,
unintentional liability in solido might result, which is undesirable
because of its burdensome character. The courts have consist-
ently applied the provisions establishing liability to attain the
clear pattern established by the Code providing for simple rules
for each type of contract.7 5
As was noticed in the common law part, it often happens
that the creditor, rather than demand performance of the debtors,
chooses, for reasons of his own, to release all or some of them.
Since several obligors undertake different duties, no authority is
72. Art. 2086, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. But the judgment for costs against
joint obligors is to be rendered in solido. Art. 2087, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870;
Hunter v. Laurtent, 158 La. 874, 104 So. 747 (1925).
73. Arts. 2082, 2083, 2088, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. It is also provided by
Art. 2092, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, that the fact that the duties of the different
parties vary does not necessarily preclude solidary liability, for one obligor
may be absolutely bound and the other one conditionally.
74. Garland v. Coreil, 17 La. App. 17, 134 So. 297 (1931).
75. Several: Teutonia National Bank v. Wagner, 33 La. Ann. 732 (1881);
Green Harding & Co. v. J. M. Relf & Co., 14 La. Ann. 828 (1859); New Orleans
Improvement & Banking Co. v. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, 10 Rob. 14
(La. 1845).
Joint: Kohn v. Hall, 8 Rob. 149 (La. 1844); Thompson v. Chretine, 3 Rob.
26 (La. 1842); Oxnard v. Locke, 13 La. 447 (1839).
In solido: Cole v. Central Contracting Co., 5 La. App. 513 (1927); Hyde
v. Wolff, 8 Mart. (N.s.) 702 (1830); Arts. 2091, 2904, LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870. See
also Comment, 25 TULANE L. REV. 217, 228 et seq. (1951).
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needed to support the proposition that one may be released with-
out affecting the others.76 Even though no reservation of rights
is explicit in the release agreement, several contracts should be
governed by the rules of contracts in general, as if they were
created by separate act.
A release of one joint debtor likewise should not effect a
release of all so bound, for although there is but one duty, it is
divided into equal parts among the obligors.7 7 Thus, since the
parties to the contract are presumed to be aware of their divisible
duty, it cannot be supposed that the obligee intended to discharge
the debt in its entirety. The Louisiana law concludes that such
a partial release of the joint obligation is not impossible in the
nature of things, nor has it been necessary to attain this result
through the circuitous route of the common law covenant not to
sue or any like device.
While no problem has resulted from the release of all the
debtors, for elementary contract principles control, the Louisiana
courts have encountered difficulties in construing a release of
fewer than all the debtors. Considerable confusion has resulted
from application of several provisions of the Civil Code regarding
discharge of solidary obligors.
Article 2100. "The creditor who consents to the division
of the debt with regard to one of the co-debtors still has an
action in solido against the others, but under the deduction
of the part of the debtor whom he has discharged from the
debt in solido."
Article 2101. "The creditor who receives separately the
part of one of the debtors without reserving in the receipt
the debt in solido or his right in general renounces the debt
in solido only with regard to that debtor.
"The creditor is not deemed to remit the debt in solido
to the debtor when he receives from him a sum equal to the
portion due by him, unless the receipt specifies that it is for
his part."
76. Art. 2084, LA. CvL CODE of 1870. Obviously enough, if the several con-
tract Is no more than a combination of two or more separate obligations, no
connexity exists on which to argue for complete discharge.
77. While no direct authority has been found for such a statement, the
vinculum Juris has been shattered by the division of the debt, and no other
argument in support of a complete discharge is conceivable. The civil law
should resort to the intention of the obligee, which is, In this case, clearly to
release only the named party.
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The phrase "debt in solido" used in the above articles is apt
to cause difficulties. It does not refer to the "debt" as such, but
to its characteristic as a solidary debt. The term solidariti was
used in the French version of the corresponding articles of the
Code of 1825, and was improperly translated as "debt in solido.'7 8
The articles were meant to refer only to releases from solidarity,
or a division of the debt, so that the parties no longer owed the
total amount, but each a determinate part. They were not to apply
to releases of the "debt" where the actual amount is reduced.
The creditor may grant this release of solidarity to one debtor
without prejudice to his rights to hold the other co-debtors in
solido, for they too receive benefits in the form of a reduction in
the amount of their total liability; since the solidarity is in favor
of the creditor, he may certainly waive it and make the obliga-
tion a divisible one.79 The effect of such a release of solidarity
only, if extended to all debtors, is to transform the solidary lia-
bility into joint liability.8 0 It is only with remission of the soli-
darity, or division of the debt, with which Articles 2100 and 2101
were intended to deal, having no reference to a release of
the debt.
On the other hand, Article 2203 provides:
"The remission or conventional discharge in favor of one
of the co-debtors in solido discharges all others, unless the
creditor has expressly reserved his right against the latter.
"In the latter case, he can not claim the debt without
making a deduction of the part of him to whom he has made
the remission."
This article is contained in the section of the Code dealing
with remission or release of the debt and not merely with abro-
gation of the solidarity or division of the total amount among the
debtors. It is apparent from the text of the article that the unre-
stricted release or remission of one of the debtors extinguishes
78. Compiled Editions of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 3 LA. LEGAL
ARCHIVES 1150-1 (1942); Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 365 (1940).
79. 2 POTHIER. OEUVREs, TRAITO DES OBLIGATIONS 131, no 277 (2d ed. 1861).
80. Id. at 327, no 617; 5 DEMANTE, COURS ANALYTIQUE DE CODE CIVIL 231, no
144, bis I (2d ed. 1883); 2 PLANIOL, TRAITP ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 270, no 773
(11th ed. 1937); 17 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 346-47, nOS 344-
46 (2d ed. 1876). This last mentioned commentator divides renunciations of
solidarity into the classes of absolute and relative. He designates those dis-
charges of solidarity which extend to all the debtors as absolute, and the
release of less than all of the duty of completed performance, as relative.
This is merely new terminology for Pothier's standard categories of personal
and real by dividing the personal into two possibilities.
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the obligation in its entirety, while the release with reservation
effectuates the intent of the creditor and discharges only the
debtors specifically named. If there is a reservation of rights
against all others, the total amount of the debt owed is decreased
by "the part of him to whom he has made the remission."'8
Our courts have often been faced with cases involving the
application of this article. Fridge v. Caruthers,2 the landmark
case in this field, involved the following facts: Of four solidary
obligors, one satisfied by personal note one-fourth of the total
obligation, receiving in return a receipt worded in part as fol-
lows: ". . . in full settlement of his obligation as one of the guar-
antors ... ." In holding the debt to be discharged completely, the
court based its reasoning on Article 2203, and the fact that no
express reservation of right was contained therein, suggesting on
rehearing that any conflict between Articles 2100 and 2203 must,
for reasons of consistency, be resolved in favor of the latter.
Chief Justice O'Niell concurred, but found no conflict between
the articles. The complete compatibility of the articles has
already been demonstrated, each referring to a release of an
entirely different relationship.
Article 2203, following the French Code,8 3 establishes the
presumption that when the creditor grants a remission or conven-
tional discharge to one of his co-debtors in solido, he intends to
remit the debt itself, thus discharging all of the debtors, unless
he reserves his rights against the others.8 4 In such event the
presumption that a real remission is intended is overcome and
the intention to grant only a personal discharge is established.8 5
Having a number of co-debtors in solido, a creditor may, if he
wishes, agree that each shall be no longer liable to him for the
whole but only for his proportionate share. If he does so, he
thereby divides the debt. This may also be called a remission of
the solidarity. 6 If a creditor receives payment from one of the
81. Art. 2203, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. The reservation must be express, but
its form is apparently not sacramental, so long as a clear intention to
restrict the operation of the discharge appears. Williams v. De Soto Bank &
Trust Co., 189 La. 245, 179 So. 303 (1938); Cusimano v. Ferrara, 170 La. 1044,
129 So. 630 (1930).
82. 156 La. 746, 101 So. 128 (1924).
83. Arts. 1210, 1211, 1285, FRENCH CIL CODE.
84. 5 DEMANTE, COURS ANALYTIQUE DE CODE CIVIL 231, no 144, bis I; 2 PLANIOL,
TRAITA ELAMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 270, no 773 (11th ed. 1937); 7 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITf' PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 1095 et seq. (2d ed. 1954);
2 POTHIER, OEUVRES, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS 129, no 275 (2d ed. 1861).
85. 2 POTHIER, op. cit. supra note 84, at 327, nos 616, 617.
86. Id. at no 585.
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solidary debtors of an amount equal to his proportionate share
and gives him a receipt therefor (as, for example, "received from
X $500") no division of the debt occurs. X still remains bound
in solido. But, if the receipt given reads "received from X $500
for his part," this establishes the creditor's intention to divide the
debt in behalf of X, or to release him from the solidarity.87 At
the same time, the words "for his part" necessarily negative an
intention to release the debt or remit the remainder, and estab-
lish clearly the applicability of Article 2101 and not of 2203.88
After determining the two types of release or remission, the
next problem is how to resolve whether the parties sought merely
to divide the debt or to effect a complete discharge of the obli-
gation. It is submitted that the result should be controlled by
the intent of the creditor, as determined from the language used
and a realistic appraisal of the entire transaction. When one
debtor in solido, X, pays "his part in full," the application of
either Article 2101 or 2203 could be supported by strong argu-
ment. Yet the use of one or the other article will produce com-
pletely different results. Under Article 2101, only the solidary
feature of the obligation of X would be discharged, without
affecting his co-debtors, except to reduce proportionately the
amount of their liability. But, if Article 2203 is found applicable,
the creditor finds himself completely divested of all recourse
against any debtor. While Pothier's intention test has not been
accepted by our Article 2203, it should be used to determine
whether the transaction was a real or a personal remission, and
whether one or the other article should be employed. In this
respect, Fridge v. Caruthers is subject to criticism. From the fact
that only one-fourth of the debt was paid by the released debtor,
it could have been concluded that the intent of the creditor was
to release that party of his solidarity only, thereby invoking the
provisions of Civil Code Article 2101 and retaining all rights in
solido against the remaining debtors.
It was seen that at common law the theory of contribution
was necessary to equalize the ultimate burden of the co-debtors.
In Louisiana, since joint debtors owe only their proportionate
share and several debtors obligate themselves only for the amount
specifically promised, it is obvious that no equalizing device is
87. Art. 1285, FRENCH CIVIL CODE.




needed. Consequently, the doctrine of contribution is not appli-
cable to either form of contract.
On the other hand, an obligor in solido undertakes to perform
the contract in its entirety and must submit to complete recovery
against him. However, Article 2103 of the Civil Code provides
that the solidary contract is divided of right among the debtors
and that each is liable only for his proportionate share.8 9 There-
fore, if one of the co-debtors in solido pays the entire debt, he is
entitled to indemnification from the others for their share.90 It
would appear that the debtor who has paid more than his share
has a joint action against his co-debtors, each of whom becomes
liable only for his aliquot share.9 1 In case of insolvency of one
co-debtor, his proportion must be borne equally by all other sol-
vent debtors, including even those previously discharged from
the solidarity.9 2 The general rule of contribution does not apply
to a surety-principal relationship, for there, although solidarity
may be expressed, it was contemplated between the parties that
the principal alone should ultimately satisfy the debt.9 3
Thus, the attempt to distribute the burden among co-debtors,
which creates complicated problems in the common law, in Loui-
siana reduces itself to a mere division of all debts in proportion
to the intent of the co-debtors and thereby produces an equitable
result; even the part of an insolvent debtor is shared by the
other obligors.
The theory of survivorship, in which the death of a joint
debtor removed him as one of the obligors and did not create a
proportionate liability upon his estate, was one of the most irra-
tional theories in the common law. Only the device of contribu-
89. Art. 2103, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; May v. Cooperative Cab Co., 52 So.2d
74 (La. App. 1951). See also Comment, 25 TULANE L. Rmv. 217, 235 (1951). The
right to contribution among solidary obligors has been litigated chiefly in a
context of joint tortfeasors. Common law accessions to that area have com-
pletely altered the rule of Article 2103. From the relatively simple rule of
the article it has been anomalously developed Into one of limitless complexi-
ties. The subject defies presentation In this restricted article, but has been
adequately covered elsewhere. Note, 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 235 (1938);
Note, 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 451 (1942); Malone, Comparative Negligence-
Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 125 (1945); Note, 7
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 592 (1947); Note, 9 TULANE L. REV. 125 (1934); Hollo-
man, Contribution between Tort-Feasors: Treatment by the Courts of Loui-
siana, 19 TULANE L. REV. 254 (1944).
90. Art. 2104, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
91. Ibid.; Wunderlich v. Palmisano, 177 So. 843 (La. App. 1938).
92. Arts. 2104, 2105, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Abat v. Holmes, 3 La. 351
(1832).
93. Arts. 2106, 3052, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
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tion introduced a proper solution. The civil law has never been
encumbered with the principle of survivorship.
The extreme technicalities inherent in the procedure for
asserting or defending joint, several, or joint and several con-
tracts at common law has already been pointed out. After noting
the great differences among those contracts, and their counter-
parts in the civil law, it should not be surprising that the civilian
theory of cumulation of actions prevailing in Louisiana is quite
different from the common law concepts of joinder. The presence
of several parties on one side or the other represents, in theory
at least, a cumulation of different rights of action.9 4 Thus, prob-
lems of cumulation of actions are presented both by joining
more than one party on either side of a suit and by urging several
causes against the same defendant. Both situations are looked
upon as "cumulation of actions," the former referring to plurality
of plaintiffs or defendants, and the latter to plurality of actions,
with virtually identical rules applicable to each. As a practical
matter, it was early recognized that where the cumulation was
by several plaintiffs or against several defendants, an additional
requirement of juridical connection between the causes would
be necessary for the sake of convenience.9 5
Contrary to what one might expect, this subject has not been
much discussed in the French legal literature. Pigeau, the leading
procedural commentator of the pre-revolutionary period, recog-
nized the general rule that "two or more actions . . . may be
cumulated, that is to say, combined in the same suit even though
based on different grounds," but this is immediately qualified by
the suggestion that the actions must be of a similar nature, to
avoid confusion on the trial.9 6 While no provision of the French
codes dealt with this particular facet of procedure, 97 the deficiency
has been partially filled by the concepts of cumul des actions98
94. Millar, The Joinder of Actions in Continental Civil Procedure, 28 Ill.
L. REV. 26 (1933).
95. To permit P to sue A on one cause of action and B on another com-
pletely unrelated one in the same suit would invite complications and diffi-
culties undreamed of in mere joinder of unrelated causes against a single
defendant.
96. 1 PIGEAU, LA PROC12DURE DU CHATELET DE PARiS 37 (ed. 1789).
97. But see Art. 1346, FRENCH CIVIL CODE, requiring joinder of all claims
of a single creditor, which are in writing; and Art. 26, FRENCH CODE DE PRO-
C2DURE CIVIL (1806) prohibiting cumulation of the petitory and possessory
actions.
98. GARSONNET ET C9ZAR-BRU, TRAITh THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE PROCUDURE
CIVILD ET COMMERCLLE 691 et seq. (12th ed. 1922).
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and rdunion de plusieurs demandes 9 But the French themselves
make no complaints on the present score, probably, as said by
Professor Millar, because "It simply means the leaving of a wide
field to the judicial discretion and so long as this is wisely admin-
istered, the system is perhaps all the better for the added
flexibility."'1 00
Las Siete Partidas indicate that prior to the eighteenth cen-
tury the fundamental principles of cumulation of actions was
accepted in Spain.10 1 While they were primarily concerned with
cumulation of causes of action by a single plaintiff against a
single defendant, it is evident that the same rules were equally
applicable to cumulation of actions by plural plaintiffs or against
plural defendants. 10 2
The Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825, in Articles 148, 149,
151, and 152 retained the Spanish rules of cumulation. The redac-
tors' notes indicate the Partidas and Febrero as the source of
these articles.1 0 3 Although it is clear that the redactors intended
to include both types of cumulation within the application of the
Code provisions, their failure to provide this expressly later
proved to be unfortunate. 0 4 The general rule of unrestricted
cumulation was limited by requiring that the several causes be
not inconsistent, just as voiced by the Partidas.0 5 It is obvious
99. 1 GLASSON ET TISSIER, TRAIT9 THIORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANIZATION
JUDICIARE, DE COMPItTENCE ET DS PROC9DURE CIVILE 466-67 (3d ed. 1925). Further-
more, the subject has been considerably narrowed at French law by the rigid
requirements of connexitd, to the effect that all connected actions must be
filed in the same court. ORDONNANCE CIVILE of 1667, tit. xx, art. 6; STEIN,
GESCHICHTE DES FRANZOSISCHEN STRAFRECHTS UND DES PROZESsEs 641-42 (2d ed.
1875).
100. Millar, The Joinder of Actions in Continental Civil Procedure, 28 ILL.
L. REV. 177, 181 (1933).
101. PARTIDAS 3.10.7; HEVIA BOLANOS, CURIA FILIPICA 63-65.
102. 1 FEBRERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANoS 61, no 76 (ed. 1790): "The plaintiff in
one petition may make civil demands against a number of persons with
respect to the same thing, or fact or with respect to various things or facts."
The degree of connexity required is not disclosed, but the rule was probably
of Romano-canonical origin, which required the cumulated actions to arise
ex eodeum facto. Millar, The Joinder of Actions in Continental Civil Pro-
cedure, 28 ILL. L. REV. 177, 194 (1933).
103. Projet of the Code of Practice of 1825, 2 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES 27, 38
(1938).
104. The initial article, 148, broadly provides that "Separate actions may
be cumulated except in cases hereafter expressed; this is termed cumulation
of action[sl." Recalling the civilian theory, it should be perfectly clear that
the subjective cumulation, or joinder of parties, was thought to be covered
by this provision.
105. PARTIDAS 3.10.7; HEVIA BOLANOS, CURIA FILIPICA 63-65; Art. 149, LA. CODE
OF PRACTICE of 1825. See also Art. 150, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825, adopting
one of the few rules of French procedure and providing that the petitory
and possessory actions could not be united in the same suit.
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that well-settled civilian precepts were sought to be incorporated
into the laws of Louisiana in 1825.
During the first half century when these provisions were
applied by the courts, no departure from the purpose of the red-
actors is perceivable, for the general rules of cumulation were
being applied to a plurality of plaintiffs or defendants as well
as to multiplicity of causes.106 These earlier cases, clearly apply-
ing the rules as intended, did no more than establish tests for
the requisite connexity. While the language of the cases is
neither clear nor precise, there exists a tendency toward the
idea of requiring that the cause arise from the same facts-ex
eodem facto. One case, in 1843, demands that the claims be "con-
nected"; 1'0 7 another in 1859, that the several defendants have a
"joint liability or privity of contract";108 still another, just a
year later, conversely insists that the plural plaintiffs have a
"joint interest or privity of contract." 09
Shortly thereafter, we first encounter the infiltration of the
common law. The common law term "misjoinder of parties"
came to be employed as a synonym for "improper cumulation of
actions" in cases involving several plaintiffs or defendants."10
This usage most probably stems from the inability of attorneys
to handle the French and Spanish texts and a consequent turning
to English texts. Also, it appears that the test of proper cumula-
tion underwent a restatement. During the era following 1856,
cumulation of parties is permissible only in cases involving a
"community of interest,""' or "mutuality of interest. 1" 2 But
it appears to this writer that the change was one of terminology
rather than of substance.
In 1907, Justice Provosty in the leading case of Gill v. City
of Lake Charles"5 paved the way for the subsequent influx of
common law rules of joinder. Presented with a question con-
106. Dyas v. Dinkgrave, 15 La. Ann. 502 (1860); Mavor v. Armant, 14 La.
Ann. 181 (1859); Waldo & Hughes v. Angomar, 12 La. Ann. 74 (1857); Theurer
v. Schmidt, 10 La. Ann. 293 (1855); Kennedy v. Oakey, 3 Rob. 404 (La. 1843).
See generally on this subject, McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana-III,
13 TULANE L. REV. 385, 390 (1939).
107. Kennedy v. Oakey, 3 Rob. 404 (La. 1843).
108. Mavor v. Armant, 14 La. Ann. 181 (1859).
109. Dyas v. Dinkgrave, 15 La. Ann. 502 (1860).
110. Cane v. Sewall, 34 La. Ann. 1096 (1882); State v. Wrotnowski, 17 La.
Ann. 156 (1865); Brewer v. Cook, 11 La. Ann. 637 (1856).
111. Favrot v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 30 La. Ann. 606 (1878).
112. State ex rel. Johnson v. Tax Collector, 39 La. Ann. 530, 2 So. 59
(1887).
113. 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).
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cerning the cumulation of actions by several plaintiffs, the
learned Justice unfortunately seized upon the opportunity to
investigate the source of the applicable rules. On this point,
he said:
"The Code is singularly silent on the subject of joinder of
parties. The provision bearing nearest upon the subject is
that contained in article (148) et seq., dealing with 'Cumu-
lated Actions', where the cumulation of several demands is
expressly authorized,, provided they are not inconsistent.
This, apparently, leaves the door open for several plaintiffs
to join their suits against several defendants, regardless of
privity or connection between them, so long as the demands
are not inconsistent. But no one ever understood that the
intention was to sanction anything of that kind, and this
court soon had occasion to discountenance such a practice,
declaring that it was 'at variance with well settled rules of
pleading' [citing earlier Louisiana cases], and that the 'law'
did not favor a 'multiplicity of actions against different
parties in the same suit' .... But the court did not say where
this 'law' and those 'well-settled rules of pleading' were to
be found.
"We look in vain for them in the Spanish and French
systems of procedure prevailing at the time of the adoption
of our Code of Practice; but we find them in the common law
books, and we know that our Code of Practice was derived
largely from that system, while our Criminal Procedure was
taken bodily from it."114
The result reached in the case is not subject to criticism, but
the dictum is unfortunate and misleading. The irony of the case
is that although saying that the "common law books" were the
true source of Louisiana procedure, the only non-Louisiana
authorities cited were equity precedents on multifariousness,
which, if followed, would have caused but minor disruption of
the civilian system. But the syllabus, which reminded future
courts that "We have to be guided in that regard by the well
settled rules of pleading as found in the books of common law"
has been repeated by subsequent decisions and interpreted as
meaning "common law procedure. 1" 5 Thus, the technicalities of
114. 119 La. 17, 19-20, 43 So. 897, 898 (1907).
115. Lykes Bros. Ripley S.S. Co. v. Wiegand Marionneaux Lumber Co.,
185 La. 1085, 171 So. 453 (1936); Dubuisson v. Long, 175 La. 564, 143 So. 494
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the common law, with the maze of rules and exceptions, began
to be superimposed upon a system conceived to provide utmost
simplicity. Neglect to state specifically that the Louisiana articles
on "cumulation of actions" applied equally well to cumulation
by several plaintiffs or against several defendants was, no doubt,
the real cause of this deviation from the purpose of the articles.
It is apparent that the Gill case as interpreted affords authority
for the position that all joint debtors must be sued together and
that several obligors cannot be sued together, for such is the
status of the common law, although that was never contemplated
in the theory of obligations of the same name in Louisiana.
It was at one time provided by the Civil Code of Louisiana 1 6
that all joint obligors "must be made defendants." The article
was recognized at an early date as conducive to inconvenience
and delay, and possibly as sanctioning such palpable injustice
as to render it absurd.117 Since each joint obligor owes only his
ratable share, and cannot be condemned to payment in full, there
is no need for any rule of required joinder. Consequently, the
Louisiana legislature repealed that article and permitted sep-
arate suit against joint obligors, at precisely the same period
when an identical provision in the common law was prominent."18
No constructive purpose was served by the rigidity of the former
article, for no joint obligor is prejudiced by being sued alone for
his share. Nor did the rule prevent harassment of the debtor
by several obligees, for the simple reason that the provisions of
the article were limited in application to joint debtors.11 9 But,
has the former rule of required joinder been revived by the
decision of the Gill case as it has been applied?
(1932); Chappuis & Chappuis v. Kaplan, 170 La. 763, 129 So. 156 (1930);
Reardon v. Dickinson, 156 La. 556, 100 So. 715 (1924); Davidson v. Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co., 126 La. 542, 52 So. 759 (1910); Dilzell Engineering &
Construction Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45 So. 138 (1907); Gates v. Bisso
Ferry Co., 172 So. 829 (La. App. 1937); Succession of Coles v. Pontchartrain
Apartment Hotel of New Orleans, 172 So. 28 (La. App. 1937); Jones v. Vernon
Parish School Board, 161 So. 357 (La. App. 1935); Shaw v. Gwin, 154 So. 392
(La. App. 1934); Wells v. Davidson, 149 So. 246 (La. App. 1933); McCaskey
Register Co. v. Barnes, 146 So. 714 (La. App. 1933). See also Brandon v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., 3 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. La. 1933).
116. Art. 2080, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1825; Art. 2085, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
117. Brown v. Robinson & Hassam, 6 La. Ann. 423 (1851); Bryne v. Rid-
dell, 3 La. Ann. 670 (1848).
118. La. Acts 1870 (E.S.), No. 103, § 2, p. 19.
119. Art. 2085, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870: "In every suit on a joint contract,
all the obligors must be made defendants, and no judgment can be obtained
against any, unless it be proved that all joined In the obligation, or are by
law presumed to have done so."
The article, as reading, cannot even purport to prevent harassment of
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It has never been doubted that debtors severally bound can
be joined in a single action if the creditor so desires. The neces-
sary connexity is presented by the single contract. While the
stringencies of required joinder are repugnant to a liberal system
of pleading, to stifle expeditious procedure by prohibiting joinder
is equally undesirable. But for the Gill case and the interpreta-
tation placed thereon in subsequent decisions, Louisiana pro-
cedure would be free from both difficulties and governed only
by the simple rules of cumulation. The anomalous character of
this landmark decision is now manifest, for it engrafts common
law rules upon a civilian system, a result hardly contemplated
by the court when it rendered the Gill decision. Because of the
vast difference between the three forms of contract at common
law and those of Louisiana, not only in the basic theory, but
also in the rules regulating the quantum of performance owed,
it is inappropriate to apply common law rules of joinder to the
joint or the several obligation in Louisiana law.
At the present time, under the Louisiana jurisprudence, it
might well be contended that the familiar common law rule,
that if "joint and several" (solidary) obligors are to be sued
jointly they must all be joined, is applicable in this state. Yet
the earlier Louisiana cases are quite to the contrary. 2 '
The misleading language of the Gill case was transformed
debtors by joint creditors, for it did not apply to joinder of obligees. Thus,
it was completely undesirable.
120. Hillebrandt v. Home Indemnity Co., 177 La. 349, 148 So. 254 (1933).
It is interesting to note the opinion of Justice Marshall on the status of
Louisiana law of cumulation of actions against several defendants, which is
also pertinent to the joinder of solidary obligors. He said, in the case of
Breedlove v. Nicolet, 7 Pet. 413, 429 (U.S. 1833): "The first error assigned,
that the suit is brought against two of three obligors, might be fatal at
common law. But the courts of Louisiana do not proceed according to the
rules of the common law. Their code is founded on the civil law, and our
inquiries must be confined to its rules.
"The note being a commercial partnership contract, is what the law of
Louisiana denotes a contract in solido, by which each party is bound severally
as well as jointly, and may be sued severally or jointly....
"The Civil Code, so far as we are informed, does not affirm or deny that
a suit may be sustained on such a contract against two of three obligors.
... He might have obtained a judgment against each for the whole sum, but
not, it is said, against two of them, in one action. If this be the rule of the
common law, it is a mere technical rule, not supported by reason or conveni-
ence. No reason other than what is merely technical can be assigned for
requiring the additoinal labor and expense of two actions for the attainment
of that which may be as well attained by one. We have no reason for
supposing that this technical principle has been engrafted on the civil law."
(Italics supplied.)
The language should be compared with that of Judge Provosty in the
Gill case, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).
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into reality within only a quarter of a century. The court relied
upon the literal meaning of Justice Provosty's language and
invoked the well-settled rule of common law that the exception
of "misjoinder of parties" was available only to a party improp-
erly joined.121 The difficulties implicit in such a holding were
soon detected by an appellate court, for in some cases it would
be virtually impossible to determine which party was and which
was not properly joined.1'2 2 Who would be permitted in such a
case to object to improper joinder of parties? Dubuisson v.
Long'23 restricted the objection to misjoinder to the parties not
joined properly. In this case, P brought suit against A, B, and
C, seeking solidary judgment. A and B were sued ex contractu,
and C was joined in tort as the instigator of the transaction in
question. P had valid actions against A and B, on the one hand,
and against C on the other, but it was assumed that there was no
interest or connection between the two sets of parties to allow
cumulation. It was held that A and B were properly joined and
could not, therefore, object to the improper joinder of C. The
only basis for finding A and B properly joined, and C not,
appears to have been that they outnumbered him; and, since he
was in the minority, he was deemed to be joined improperly. The
court merely counted the parties in each group of defendants,
and upon finding that those who had objected were in the major-
ity, concluded that they were properly joined and therefore could
not avail themselves of the objection. 24 No solution was sug-
gested for a similar situation in which both sets of defendants
were equal in number.
Precisely such circumstances were presented in Delesdernier
Estate v. Zettwoch,"25 where two groups of defendants, thirteen
persons in each group, were sought to be sued together. The
court, being unable to determine who was and who was not
properly joined, could not determine who could object to the
joinder and dismissed the suit.126
121. Dubuisson v. Long, 175 La. 564, 143 So. 494 (1932).
122. Gates v. Bisso Ferry Co., 172 So. 829, 832 (La. App. 1937). McCaleb, J.,
said: "[lIt occurs to us that there must often arise cases in which the ques-
tion [of determining which party is improperly joined] would present great
difficulty."
123. 175 La. 564, 143 So. 494 (1932).
124. See McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana-III, 13 TULANE L. REV.
385 (1939).
125. 175 So. 137 (La. App. 1937).
126. See Davidson v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 126 La. 542, 52 So. 759
(1910). Contra: Darden v. Garrett, 130 La. 998, 58 So. 857 (1912).
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Even more serious, perhaps, than the rule limiting the excep-
tion of misjoinder to parties improperly sued, is the penalty
imposed-dismissal of the action. Article 152 of the Code of
Practice and the earlier cases would merely require the plaintiff
to elect which cause he would pursue.127 Dismissal of the entire
suit, however, has been imposed by later cases, probably on the
mistaken belief that common law rules were to be applied.12
Although these rules cannot possibly prove workable in Loui-
siana, they are completely adequate at common law, where no
difficulty is experienced in determining the party improperly
joined. Under the common law, three simple rules are applied:
(1) all joint debtors must be joined; (2) several debtors cannot
be joined; and (3) if joint and several debtors are to be joined
at all, every one of them must be made a party. But, Louisiana
law cannot possibly function under these rules, for here the
theory behind the particular type of promise is totally different
and does not lend itself to arbitrary and technical requisites of
joinder or non-joinder.
Probably the court in the Gill case did not anticipate the
judicial distortion which would result from their ambiguous
terminology. From the unfortunate use of the phrase "common
law books" has grown a series of rules which lead only to injus-
tice. First, only the parties improperly joined can object; and
second, if the court is unable to determine the person improperly
joined, it cannot determine who has a right to object and, hence,
dismisses the suit. Such reasoning creates a vicious circle which
results ultimately in substantial deprivation of rights.
Because of the almost total absence of any requirements of
necessary joinder in Louisiana, the exception of non-joinder is
seldom encountered. If there are no parties who are necessarily
made litigants, it can never be objected that such parties are
omitted. In but one case, suit by beneficiaries under wrongful
death provisions, have the courts erected impediments of required
joinder, and there it seems to be predicated particularly on the
127. St. Geme v. Boimare, 117 La. 232, 41 So. 557 (1906). Cf. Cane v.
Sewall, 34 La. Ann. 1096 (1882).
128. Delesdernier Estate v. Zettwoch, 175 So. 137 (La, App. 1937); McGee
v. Collins, 156 La. 291, 100 So. 430 (1924); Strong v. Robbins, 137 La. 680, 69
So. 93 (1915); Davidson v. Fletcher, 126 La. 535, 52 So. 761 (1910); Davidson v.
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 126 La. 542, 52 So. 759 (1910); Copellar v. Britt,
188 So. 403 (La. App. 1939).
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desire to prevent excessive harassment of an obligor by statu-
torily linked creditors. 129
The system presented to us by our early procedural codes
was founded in utmost simplicity and was far in advance of any
competing body of American law. As was said by the foremost
student of comparative procedure in the United States:
"And it is also interesting to reflect that if the framers
of the American code procedure had turned their eyes to
the procedure of Louisiana-utilizing as it did, for the basis
of its law of joinder the rules of the Partidas which permitted
the cumulation of actions not contrary to each other, and a
rule moreover which had been found entirely compatible
with trial by jury-they would have had at command the
key to a vastly simpler and infinitely better system than
that which their mis-applied ingenuity succeeded in con-
structing. In either case, the subsequent path of our pro-
cedure would have been less thickly strewn with the wrecks
of litigation fallen afoul of the gratuitous technicalities of
the system in being."'180
Thus far, though, the accretions of the common law have
distorted only the two basic civilian principles mentioned above,
so it will not be too difficult to restore the traditional civilian rules
of cumulation of parties. Any delay, however, in the legislative
action might allow time for further destruction of civilian
principles.
The Louisiana State Law Institute recently published stud-
ies and recommendations for the revision of the Code of Prac-
tice' 8' which will eliminate most of the present difficulties arising
in the field of cumulation of actions. On the basis of the Insti-
tute's studies and recommendations, it is submitted that any
legislation in this field should comply with at least the following
basic requirements:
(1) Care and specificity should be exercised to include
cumulation of plural plaintiffs or against plural defendants with-
in the general scheme.
129. Art. 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Pierce v. Robertson, 190 La. 377, 182
So. 544 (1938); Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931).
130., Millar, The Joinder of Actions in Continental Civil Procedures, 28
ILL. L. REV. 177, 203 (1938).
131. Arts. 11, 12, Book I, Preliminary Titles, Title III, Civil Actions, 1




(2) Cumulation of parties should be permitted if there be
either a community of interest, or if the causes arise out of the
same facts-ex eodem facto.
(3) If the cumulation of parties is improper, any litigant
should be free to avail himself of the objection, for it is apparent
that his rights in the matter will be influenced and probably
prejudiced thereby.
(4) If the objection is sustained, the plaintiff should have
at least the prerogative of election and, possibly, if deemed
feasible, should receive the benefit of judicial division of his
claims, each to be tried separately, in the interest of expeditious
judicial action.
William D. Brown III
Article 1030, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870-
The Prescription of Acceptance or
Renunciation of Successions
Article 10301 states that: "The faculty of accepting or re-
nouncing a succession becomes barred by the lapse of time re-
quired for the longest prescription of the rights to immovables."
This article is a literal translation of Article 7892 of the French
Civil Code and has appeared in all three of the Louisiana Civil
Codes.3 To the French commentator Marcad6 its real meaning
seemed "facile."'4 Justice McCaleb, in a recent case,5 observed:
"[T]he literal meaning of the Article is perfectly clear and pre-
sents no problem of interpretation. .. " But he added: "Yet, there
is probably no other provision of our Code which has caused a
greater diversity of opinion than this Article." Judge Saunders,
speaking of Articles 1030 and 1031, says: "Now I do not know,
1. LA. CIVIL CoDE of 1870.
2. "La facult6 d'accepter ou de rdpudler une succession, se prescrtt par
le laps de temps requis pour la prescription la plus longue des droits immo-
billers."
3. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1808, 3.1.94, p. 164; Art. 1023, LA. CIVm CODE of 1825.
4. 3 MARCAD9, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL 167 (7th ed. 1873): "Pour nous,
ces interprdtations multiplides et si contradictoires nous ont toujours 4tonnd,
et le vrai sens de I'article nous a toujours paru facile."
5. Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103, 115, 52 So.2d 437, 441 (1951).
[VOL. XIV
